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European Union Military Operations

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Debate on the European financing of defence and, more specifically, on the financing of military capabilities has begun. The stakes are industrial, military, strategic and political. This period of turmoil is Act II of the European Union's investment in the military domain. Because there was a first act. For a time, the European Union saw itself as a player in international security. That was the era of external operations. This action is still on-going. In 2025, it continued to conduct eight military operations and missions in Europe and Africa. This international action does not represent the same challenges as armament. But at a time when several countries are considering a "coalition of the willing" on the borders of Ukraine, it seems relevant to take stock of these crisis management interventions.

I - MILITARY OPERATIONS

1.1 - Gradual development

a) The context of the early 1990s: Maastricht and the Balkan wars

The Maastricht Treaty (1992) marked a milestone in the history of European integration with two major creations that revealed a new political ambition: the euro and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The European Union sees itself as a global player. Europe is self-confident, and history has proven it right. The break-up of the Communist bloc in 1989/1991 was a victory for one model and was accompanied by a geopolitical earthquake: all the member countries of the Warsaw Pact, with the exception of the USSR and three of the former republics of the USSR, changed alliances and joined NATO! The East moved to the West. And applications for membership of the European Union were not long in coming.

The European Union saw itself as a global player. Would it at least be a regional one? Because war was coming to Europe. The wars in the former Yugoslavia, just a few kilometres from the Union's borders, were both a consequence of the upheaval mentioned above and a test of the Maastricht Treaty. '*Europe's hour has come*,' people thought at the time. The alarm clock rang in Europe, but it was the Americans who got up and went to war. Four wars in ten years. 150,000 dead. In 1999, 78 days of NATO bombing of Serbia marked the beginning of the end of the territorial and ethnic conflict.

b) The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and Concordia, the first military operation (2003)

A few Member States played their part in these Balkan wars, but the European Union was almost entirely absent. This is a harsh assessment, but the ambition remains. The turning point came with the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997). Crisis management operations and missions became part of the Union's remit, such as the WEU's peace-keeping and peace-making missions defined by the Member States in Petersberg in 1992. These operations involve the use of combat forces. Joint actions are decided unanimously by the Council, but the abstention of one Member State does not prevent the decision from being adopted. In December 2002, the European Union and NATO concluded an "arrangement" allowing the latter to use NATO's logistical resources (known as the Berlin Plus agreements). In January 2003, the

European Union conducted its first military operation in Macedonia: Concordia. A minor operation (North Macedonia is the only country of the former Yugoslavia that has not had a war), but a political turning point: the European Union positioned itself as a player in international security and demonstrated its ability to conduct crisis management operations, including through military means made available to it by Member States.

1.2 - Regime

The military operations regime was established between 2004 and 2007. It is based on three elements: an institutional foundation, procedures and a funding mechanism.

a) The institutional foundation

The Lisbon Treaty (2007) confirms this military-oriented 'operational' focus. It establishes a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which is an integral part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The CSDP '*shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civil and military assets*' (Art. 42.1). The European Union may use this capacity '*in operations outside the Union*'. The Petersberg missions have now been extended to include military advice and assistance, disarmament and the fight against terrorism (Art. 43.1). Defence remains the prerogative of the Member States, but the Union now has its own projection capacity.

b) Regarding procedures

The Union's military operations and missions are decided by the Council acting unanimously on a proposal from the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or from a Member State (see Annex 1). The abstention of a Member State does not prevent the decision from being adopted (rule of constructive abstention, Article 31). The Member State concerned may combine its abstention with a formal declaration. It is not obliged to implement the decision, but it accepts that the decision is binding for the Union. This also allows it to opt out of contributing to financing the operation.

With the expansion of missions, national military resources are called upon to varying degrees. The mandates given by the Council concern two types of mission:

Executive missions correspond to '*combat force missions for crisis management*', including peace-making missions. These are effective 'military operations' – as the Council describes them in its decisions – involving the deployment of forces and, where necessary, armed engagements on land or at sea (operations identified by the acronyms EUFOR and EUNAVFOR).

Non-executive missions correspond to military training or assistance missions (identified by the acronyms EUTM and EUMAM).

However, this distinction is becoming less and less relevant as missions can change and end up overlapping, as in the case of EUNAVFOR, for example Atalanta[1]. Logically, the term 'military operations' should be reserved solely for executive operations. However, the concept is used extensively whenever a military element participates in the mission, thus often blurring the distinction between '*military missions and operations*'.

c) Financing operations

The principle was established in the Treaty of Amsterdam and is formalised in Article 41. The scheme is as follows: administrative costs (EU staff) are paid from the EU budget. Common costs are financed by the Member States through a collective financing mechanism outside the Union budget. Except in the case of constructive abstention coupled with a declaration (as in the case of Denmark), common costs are financed by 26 Member States. Even if they do not participate in the operation, their share in the financing is proportional to their share in GNP. Other expenditure incurred by operations (85 to 90% of the total cost of an operation) is paid by the Member States from their budgets according to a simple principle: the more they contribute to the operation, the more they pay.

The definition of common costs was set in 2004 by a Council decision establishing Athena, a "*mechanism*

[1] *Launched in 2008 as an operation to combat piracy in the Indian Ocean, it was modified in 2020 (Decision (CFSP) 2020/2188) to include secondary executive operations (contributing to the arms embargo in Somalia) and non-executive missions to combat illegal fishing, timber trafficking and narcotics trafficking.*

for managing the financing of the common costs of EU operations having military or defence implications". The system is complex because common costs vary depending on the nature of the expenditure and the phase of the operation[2]. However, with this three-pronged approach of agreements, procedures and funding, the European Union has been able to engage in crisis management and military operations before adjusting its position.

1.3 - How they have evolved

Ten operations involving the deployment of armed forces have taken place since 2003 (see Annex 2). However, it is important to distinguish between two periods.

a) 2003/2020: crisis management operations, "the key instruments of the CFSP"

The first two operations (Concordia in North Macedonia and Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina) were based primarily on an agreement with NATO (Berlin +) that allowed the European Union to use NATO resources. A formal framework was established after 2004. A series of purely European operations then followed, driven by experience, international tensions in Africa and the UN, which was extremely active at the time. Most of the Council's decisions on military operations are based on UN Security Council resolutions. Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter on "*action in case of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, and acts of aggression*" provides that "*the Security Council shall make recommendations or decide what measures shall be taken (...) to maintain or restore international peace and security*" (Article 39 of the Charter). States ensure that their armed forces are available to the Council to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security (Art. 43). The European Union may thus be authorised to "use force if necessary", as is the case for EUFOR Althea (Resolution 1551 (2004)). The mandate was intended to be for a limited period. In October 2025, the UN Security Council renewed it. The operation has been ongoing for 22 years. Of the ten military operations conducted by the European Union, nine were decided upon before 2021. The operations involved the deployment of armed forces of varying sizes (between a few hundred and 7,000 troops) on land (EUFOR) or at sea (EUNAVFOR) in Europe and Africa. These operations included peace support in Europe, maritime security (anti-piracy), and securing elections in Africa. Military operations were then '*the main instruments of the CFSP*'[3] and helped position Europe as a player in regional security.

b) Military operations since 2021

That period is now over. Admittedly, the method of intervention is not obsolete, since a new operation was decided upon in 2024. (EUNAVFOR Aspides), extended since then, and in October 2025, the UN Security Council renewed the mandate of Operation Althea. However, these operations now play only a minor role in the range of military interventions. The main lever for intervention is military assistance. On the other hand, military operations are making a minor comeback in the form of support for joint European military exercises. Funding is provided for in Article 45 of the Regulation on the European Peace Facility. The first European military exercise was carried out in October 2023 (MILEX in Spain brought together 2,800 soldiers from nineteen Member States, including 600 French soldiers). According to one study, the joint cost was €5 million, comparable to the Concordia operation. A similar exercise was repeated in 2024 and 2025[4].

1.4 - Military assistance missions

The war in Ukraine obviously marked a turning point. But in reality, the shift had begun earlier.

a) 2020/2021, first missions in Africa: the Peace Facility for Africa

Can the European Union ensure stability in a conflict-ridden environment? Africa, weakened by threats of destabilisation, was a testing ground for this new positioning. In 2000, the new African Union[5] was given responsibility for security issues in Africa and deployed its own peace missions. The European Union supported these initiatives with the creation of the Peace Facility for Africa (APF), a way of organising security cooperation with the African Union. This shift

[2] *There are common costs that are covered regardless of the timing (staff, recruitment of local personnel), operational costs for the preparatory phases covered by Athena (medical services, satellite imagery), and operational costs for the active phase, which are subdivided into three elements: costs always covered by Athena (medical repatriation, field hospitals), costs covered when the Council decides (transport and accommodation of forces) and the costs covered when requested by the operation command and approved by the special committee set up within Athena (accommodation, intelligence, mine clearance)*

[3] *Catherine Schneider, crisis management operations and missions, 6-12 March 2017*

[4] *MILEX 2024 in Germany, (1700 soldiers from 15 Member States) and MILEX 2025 in Hungary (5000 soldiers from 13 Member States)*

[5] *In 2000, The African Union replaced the Organisation of African Unity.*

was not without tension between states, as this military cooperation was part of the partnership agreements concluded in Cotonou in 2000 and was financed by the European Development Fund. The policy guidelines were clear: the European Union supported the African Union (not individual states), and the fund (€300 million per year) intended to finance its multilateral peace support operations but not combat operations. In practice, there were countless difficulties. Europe provided assistance in operations related to military operations, such as troop transport, IT and supplies, but did not finance salaries or training. The major issue was the supply of equipment, particularly weapons. The supply of weapons and ammunition was not included in eligible expenditure. In reality, the APF quickly showed its limitations. European assistance "*operated in a grey zone*". The debate on lethal weapons led to absurd situations (European military personnel could train staff but without ammunition). Both sides therefore agreed on the need to establish a new framework for military intervention.

b) 2021. The European Peace Facility

In 2021, the European Peace Facility (EPF) reformed the APF system and became the main instrument for European military aid. It aims to support two distinct missions based on two different foundations and organised into pillars. The "operations" pillar corresponds to CSDP operations with military or defence implications (Articles 42.4 and 43.2 TEU). The missions extend across the whole world. The common costs are covered by the EPF, which has taken over from the Athena mechanism.

A new "Assistance Measures" pillar finances third countries and regional or international organisations (Articles 28 and 30 TEU). Actions under this pillar aim to strengthen defence capabilities and support the military aspects of peace support operations. This pillar is itself divided into two parts: the training mission, which involves sending a contingent to the field, which explains why training activities are included among the interventions; and the assistance mission, which consists of providing equipment and contributing to the financing of its acquisition, whether lethal or non-lethal.

The European Peace Facility is a strategic turning point for the Union. It is bringing changes that will prove crucial. As a tool for financing operations outside the Union, it can help states and not just international organisations. The European Union can supply or finance the purchase of equipment. This was the main request from African states. Finally, assistance extend to providing lethal equipment.

c) Some facts

The assistance component was activated in 2021[6]. In Africa (African Union, Mozambique, Mali), since the EPF intended to replace the APF but also in Ukraine, even before the Russian invasion of 24 February 2022. The war has completely changed the nature of European intervention, which until then had consisted of crisis management operations and peace and security support missions. This aspect has been swept away by events. Without being completely abandoned, military intervention in the event of a crisis with contingents deployed on the ground is now only incidental. Intervention now takes place through other channels: training aid and assistance in the acquisition of ammunition and equipment. The financing of equipment is the preferred route for European military intervention.

The budgetary resources allocated to the EPF are increasing considerably. When it was created in 2021, the planned allocation for the period 2021-2027 was €5.69 billion (current prices). By the end of 2022, 86% of the budget had been spent on assistance for Ukraine. On three occasions, in 2023 and 2024, the allocation was increased to €17.04 billion, including €5 billion earmarked for Ukraine. In four years, the Council adopted 71 military assistance decisions (see Annex 3). Ukraine was obviously the priority recipient country. In February 2026, the Council estimated the EU's financial assistance to Ukraine at €11.1 billion, not including support from Member States, which brings the total to €69.7 billion.

[6] *The EPF was activated in 2021. In Mozambique to provide training and equipment assistance (19 November 2021). Then in Mali, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine (EPF 2 December 2021).*

II - EVALUATION OF EXTERNAL MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

2.1 From a diplomatic point of view.

The stakes involved in these military operations are enormous. Military operations form part of the international landscape, and an external operation is political before it is military. Failure would have spelled the end of the CSDP, and Europe would have had to abandon all international ambitions. By resorting to the use of force, it is employing tools that are usually reserved for states. Even a modest European operation helps to transcend the logic of 'national defence' and marks a heightened awareness of shared interests. There is a symbolic power in European military operations that goes beyond the action itself.

Military operations form part of a range of diplomatic tools falling under the CFSP and broaden the scope of possible actions. It is often deployed in conjunction with (civil-military operations such as in Darfur) or following, or preceding, civilian missions in the fields of justice or policing. There is a *continuum* between military operations, civilian actions, and economic and financial partnerships. "*This versatility is sometimes envied by other organisations, including NATO, which occasionally likes to dream of a 'reverse Berlin+.*"[7]

Through its military operations, the European Union gains operational credibility amongst international actors. They can step in following recognised international forces. This was the case in 2003 (Concordia) and, in 2004, when Althéa succeeded SFOR, the NATO-led Stabilisation Force, which itself followed on from IFOR, the NATO force implementing the Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement, which in turn succeeded UNPROFOR. A logical progression, but one that entails a binding responsibility.

All European Union military operations have been linked to the UN. This basis, whilst not strictly necessary, proves very useful in achieving unanimity. States with a tradition of multilateralism or neutrality are, as a matter of principle, reluctant to accept any external military intervention. In the eyes of public opinion, UN endorsement lends legitimacy to the military operation and makes it acceptable. European operations provide an opportunity to participate in security operations outside the major military alliances. Note, for example, the presence of Austrian and Swiss contingents (Althea) or Irish contingents (EUFOR Chad).

2.2 The military significance of European operations

The aim is not to compete with the forces of major international alliances; any such comparisons would prove devastating. Europe is a military 'dwarf' – the epithets are well-known and far from flattering. This overlooks the fact that crisis management forces are neither displays of force, nor intervention forces, nor *a fortiori* military operations. EUFOR is not the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (45 states, 130,000 troops)! Having established this premise, European operations can be analysed from several angles: military effectiveness, multinational experience and lessons learnt on the ground.

The success of operations varies. A distinction must be made between the military impact of an operation and that of an executive operation or a non-executive mission. Some operations have been ongoing for 20 years (Althea), whilst others were scrapped and cancelled before they could even begin[8]. From a strictly military perspective, the naval operations are regarded as successes by all observers. Although it is reasonable to assume that a comparable outcome might have been achieved within a less cumbersome bilateral framework than the European one. Opinions are more divided when it comes to the deployment of ground forces and training activities. The first military operations in the former Yugoslavia (Concordia and Althea) were targeted peace support. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the situation remains fragile. Every village flies its own flag. The fire smoulders beneath the ashes, but the war has not resumed. In Africa, European operations have yielded mixed results. EUFOR Mali, the longest-running and most costly military operation in Africa, has faced translation issues, a lack of personnel supervision, financial

[7] *Catherine Schneider: EU crisis management operations and missions: key instruments of the CSDP, University of Grenoble, 6–12 March 2017*

[8] EUFOR Libya *was called off before the first troops could be deployed. The operation had been intended to support the United Nations' humanitarian efforts. However, the deployments were contingent upon the approval of the United Nations office … which was never granted.*

arrangements at the discretion of local authorities, etc.; common difficulties for military operations in Africa.

Not to mention the possibility of unintended consequences. "*The EPF, an extra-budgetary instrument, was initially created to train armies, mainly in Africa, and not to purchase weapons. This shortcoming has facilitated the expansion of Russia's presence in Africa through arms sales, particularly in the Central African Republic*"[9]. As for Mali, what has become of the 16,000 soldiers trained by EUTM Mali? It is not known how many have gone over to the side of Islamic terrorism. Following a European training programme before joining Wagner?

Multinational experience

European military operations are international ventures involving the deployment of combat forces. The funding of common costs is shared, but participation is voluntary. Levels of participation vary by country and by mission (France has only a small contingent in Bosnia and Herzegovina but maintains a significant presence in EUFOR missions in Africa). EUFOR Chad comprised 3,300 military personnel, more than half of whom (1,640) were French. Spain and Italy also frequently participate in European operations. The specific cases of Ireland (EUFOR Chad) and Austria (Althea) have been mentioned. Institutional constraints (parliamentary approval) explain why Germany often has only a modest presence within operations. EUFOR Congo in 2006 was Germany's first significant participation in a European operation. Germany was then designated as the lead nation. These cooperative efforts are not mere juxtapositions but genuine multilateral cooperation, whereby one state's resources may be made available to another (French units on board Italian aircraft, for example).

European military operations provide an irreplaceable experience in international force command. Planning and conducting an operation involving forces from 20 or 30 states, even with symbolic contingents, is a military challenge. The planning headquarters (in Europe) and the field headquarters are under the authority of commanders of different nationalities. The designation of a state as the lead nation has significant implications for material contributions and command responsibility. Rapid rotations (every six months) enable a large number of countries to exercise international military responsibilities. The Deputy Operation Commander of Atalanta has been Spanish, Italian, British, Portuguese and Greek.

On the ground, feedback has been more mixed

European operations involve a large number of units with varying levels of experience. The challenge is to demonstrate the ability to work together. For smaller armed forces, and particularly for special forces which have few opportunities for overseas deployment, this provides an unrivalled training opportunity. EUFOR missions have even served as a catalyst for innovation. For example, one of the first uses of surveillance drones by a Belgian unit, during EUFOR Congo in 2006. European operations also provide an opportunity to understand the considerable logistical challenges of any international operation, particularly in Africa (cargo aircraft, water). For some, this combination represents the beginnings of a European army through the cooperation of units from several countries.

Nevertheless, European operations cannot be regarded as genuine military training. This is because they have two shortcomings. The issue of ammunition supply, which is crucial in high-intensity conflicts, does not arise. Real combat experience is lacking. EUFOR missions do involve gunfire, but only on a very sporadic basis and without large-scale engagement[10]. Military experience without ammunition or exposure to fire can only be partial. These limitations also highlight underlying problems.

2.3 Common technical and budgetary challenges

The coordination of military operations

All international operations face difficulties in coordinating with the various actors on the ground. The proliferation of international non-governmental organisations and, in particular, humanitarian organisations—which are always keen to preserve their independence—does not make military missions any

[9] *Seminar on the EPF, Military Academy Research Institute, 9 June 2025.*

[10] *In 2006, soldiers from EUFOR Congo intervened to protect the opposition leader, who was under siege in his residence by soldiers from the presidential guard.*

easier. However, European operations face additional difficulties when they overlap with national military operations (EUFOR Chad and the French-led Operation Épervier), or even with multinational operations led by the African Union or the UN. Coordination with the United Nations is sometimes problematic[11]. Coordination may be required at European level when missions combine civilian and military operations, or when missions overlap, as is the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina with a military mission, a police mission and a pre-accession mission. A European military operation is also an exercise in diplomacy.

Comments on the budget

The Council's decisions provide for a budget based on a reference amount intended to finance common costs. The cost is then allocated among the Member States in proportion to their share of GNI. Defining common costs is particularly complex. However, the assessment of costs alone also gives rise to many misunderstandings[12]. Common costs account for only a small fraction of the total cost of the operation. The current estimate is between 10 and 15 per cent. European operations are overwhelmingly funded through national budgets. Participation in European military operations represents a financial burden for Member States. It comprises two elements: the contribution to the EDF, which finances the common costs, and the cost that remains the responsibility of the Member State. The total cost of an operation is therefore virtually impossible to determine, as each Member State finances its own share separately. The breakdown has sometimes been provided by Member State and by operation[13]. In France, the contribution is partly funded from the defence budget and partly (insofar as it relates to non-lethal assistance measures) from the foreign affairs budget. Whether at European or national level, European military operations involve a demanding budgetary process.

Based on a total reference amount of €352 million for the 10 operations, the total cost of European military operations (stricto sensu) is in the region of €2.3 billion.

This budgetary framework is just one aspect of the procedural complexity. A European operation begins with an administrative obstacle course punctuated by countless meetings. This is a feature that is not unique to defence policy or to the Commission, as the Athena and EPF decisions are Council decisions (the same criticism is often levelled at the common agricultural policy), but it is exacerbated by the dual nature of the operation being both military and international. From an administrative and budgetary perspective, the European military operation is a nightmare. How is it possible that such a good idea has resulted in so much complexity? The procedural complexity is indicative of the differences between Member States. The paragraph added at the last minute to a regulation is often the condition for unanimity.

III - THE IMPACT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE UNION

Military operations and missions are highly political undertakings that have a significant impact on the functioning of the European Union.

3.1 Debates between Member States

The inclusion of a military dimension in European Union missions, in the form of interventions involving combat forces, has not been without its difficulties within the Union. Three issues can be highlighted.

The first is the principle of military operations and assistance. This approach may be accepted when it involves contributing to stability in the Western Balkans or combating piracy, which is clearly in the collective interest. It poses more of a problem when it comes to assistance operations in Africa (*via* the African Peace Facility). It must be said that using European defence funds to finance security in Africa is not self-evident. Responses to this development have often been starkly divided. On the one hand, there are the countries that support European military assistance, which have experience or a direct interest in security in Africa (France, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Germany). On the other, there are those States that hold back. A

[11] This was the case with EUFOR Chad. Following the deterioration of the situation in Darfur, the EU decided to deploy a European security force for refugees. The mandate was due to end a year later. MINURCAT (the United Nations mission) was supposed to take over. Except that MINURCAT failed to materialise. See also Louis Gisard d'Estaing and Françoise Olivier Coupeau, report on the cost of external operations, National Assembly, 2009 (in French)

[12] For example, a government may cover – prior to reimbursement by the EPF – the transport costs for a partner's units, and vice versa on the return journey. However, one party will invoice the variable cost for the outward journey, whilst the other will factor in depreciation. This difference is comparable to that which exists in France between fuel costs and mileage allowance. The difference in valuation for the same service can vary from 1 to 3.

[13] For EUFOR Chad, the reference cost was 119 million. France covered 15.57%, or 18.5 million, to which 130 million from the national budget was added. Op. cit.

French parliamentary report states: "*Certain Northern European States have a principled reluctance towards military interventions and are resisting any move towards the militarisation of the EU, which they deem contrary to the ideals of peace that underpinned its foundation*". Not to mention the position of the United Kingdom, already mentioned.

The tension centred mainly on the provision of lethal weapons. The debate lasted two years. A debate of principle on a subject that, moreover, lacks relevance, given that non-lethal equipment can prove decisive in the advance of armies.

The second issue is the democratic oversight of operations. Unanimity requires a great deal of compromise, which is first reflected in the texts. Operations and military assistance involving lethal weapons are governed by rules of conditionality and control. The Council decides on a case-by-case basis what type of assistance and equipment may be provided. EPF assistance measures are based on risk analyses. The Council assesses safeguards, respect for human rights and international humanitarian law, and the prevention of the diversion of weapons. "*No assistance measure may be used for the supply of items that would be incompatible with the Union's international law or obligations*"[14]. For example, landmines are banned. The Council may also suspend European aid.

The third issue concerns the mission mandate, as defined by the Council Decision. Here too, the requirement for unanimity means that adjustments must be made to accommodate Member States' requests. "*A number of Northern European states have requested that training for Malian soldiers on gender equality be included in the EUTM Mali mandate. Whilst laudable in itself and certainly justified in principle, such training may not be the priority given the situation in the country*."[15]

Even though it has increased the number of its operations and missions, "*the EU has remained a cautious international actor that tends to avoid the use of force*"[16]. The absolute taboo is risk to life. Executive missions are designed to avoid any risk of confrontation. Non-executive missions exclude any exposure to combat. A European military operation cannot return with coffins in the holds of C-130s or, worse still – given the media coverage that would follow – have hostages in the hands of rebel groups. 'Died for the Union'? Unthinkable. These various constraints have forced Europe to set limits on its actions.

Can peacetime military operations serve as a basis for experience in wartime? The fundamental issue is the relationship between the principles, virtues and values upheld by the European Union and military assistance. Restricting the supply of lethal weapons, including ill-suited clauses, and avoiding any exposure to risk are peacetime niceties. We came very close to seeing arms deliveries curtailed for environmental reasons (given the enormous consumption of military equipment). The Union takes its standards – its values – to the point of caricature. The war in Ukraine has swept all of this away. In March 2022, Denmark renounced its opt-out and, consequently, its constructive abstention. Must the EU also undergo this transformation? The EU's guiding principles can no longer remain the same. Just as there is a war economy with its constraints, there are also wartime values that require adaptation.

3.2 Institutional rivalry between the Council and the Commission

There is a form of institutional rivalry between the European Council and the Commission on military matters, although the term 'rivalry' should be qualified: it is more a case of tension between the two institutions, putting the Council under pressure.

A breakthrough by the Commission in the military sphere

The war in Ukraine has changed Europe. The military challenge is clear. Yet the drive to build up military capabilities, although first mentioned in the Treaty of Nice in 2001, remained marginal for a long time. The war has shifted priorities but also altered the way institutions operate. The Commission's breakthrough in the military sphere is undeniable. Institutional deadlocks have been circumvented. The ESDP falls under the Council's remit. So be it. Support for the

[14] *Art 49 §5 of the Council's decision*

[15] *op cit*

[16] *op. cit.*

defence industry falls under industrial policy and competitiveness (Article 173 TEU) and the internal market (Article 114 TEU). The Commission therefore regains its power of initiative. Not a year goes by without the Commission proposing new funding instruments: on support for the arms industry (European Defence Fund, EDF), on ammunition manufacturing capabilities (ASAP), on aid for joint equipment procurement (EDIRPA), on support for military equipment (EDIP), and on military mobility. When the EU budget is insufficient, the Commission proposes that funding be provided through borrowing (SAFE). These are all initiatives indirectly aimed at increasing the EU's defence capabilities, but which above all mark the Commission's – which holds the initiative – assumption of power over military matters.

The question arises first and foremost in terms of principles. The Commission's ability to draw on non-military expertise (industry, competitiveness, the internal market) is matched by its obvious duplicity. In response to a reasoned opinion issued by the Senate[17] considering that the draft EDIP regulation did not comply with the principle of subsidiarity, the Commission chose to dismiss the argument: '*none of the objectives or components of the Commission's proposal relate to the common security and defence policy*'. But the dispute is primarily with the Council.

A Council under pression

The timeline speaks volumes. The European Peace Facility (EPF) and the European Defence Fund (EDF) were both established within a month of each other in March and April 2021. This coincidence is surely no accident. "*The EEAS saw this as a way of institutionally competing with the European Commission, which in the process of launching the European Defence Fund*"[18]. This pattern has been ongoing for three years. Every initiative taken by one is followed by an initiative from the other. Since the start of the war in Ukraine, the Council has adopted more than 70 decisions on military assistance. In 2024, the Council established a '*facility for Ukraine*' funded by the EPF, and in 2025, the Commission launched a '*support fund for Ukraine*'.

The two tables below show the Council's and the Commission's legal and budgetary initiatives in the military sphere. How can one fail to be struck by the coordination between the two? Admittedly, urgency dictates, but is it only about urgency?

[17] *Reasoned opinions adopted by the chambers of national parliaments and forwarded to the Commission reflect concerns regarding compliance with the powers conferred by the Treaty*

[18] *IIRSEM, seminar on the EPFD, op. cit.*

Comparison of budgetary commitments made by the EU (Commission initiative) and by the Council in the military sector (€ million)

	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	Total 2021/2026
EPF Budget (Conseil)	399	591	980	2785	4047	4092	4146	12894
EU Budget (Commission)	1173	1177	1428	1964	1837	1382		8961

Source : Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/890, Annex 1. Commission, annual budgets, Title 13 (in commitment appropriations)

Commission and Conseil Initiatives in terms of Defence 2021/2025

Council (military operations and assistance)	Commission (military capabilities)
22 March 2021: creation of the European Peace Facility (EPF) decision CFSP2021/509	
	29 April 2021: regulation European Defence Funds (EDF)
13 March 2023: increase in the EPF + 2 billion decision CFSP 2023/577	
20 March 2023: Council: agreement to increase the EPF by 3.5 billion	
5 May 2023: agreement on ammunitions for Ukraine 1 billion	
26 June 2023: increase of the EPF + 3.5 milliards Decision (EU) 2023/1304	
	20 July 2023: ammunitions manufacture regulation (ASAP)
	18 October 2023: defence industry regulation (EDIRPA)
	5 March 2024 : Strategy for the European Defence Industry (EDIS) and defence industry regulation (EDIP)
18 March 2024: increase of the EPF + 5 milliards assistance funds for Ukraine: CFSP Decision 2024/890	
	19 March 2025: presentation of the Whitepaper on defence and the ReArm Europe plan
	16 December 2025: EDIP regulation with an "instrument to support Ukraine"

Source : Legislation and CFSP decisions; author's note

Matter of power

The EPF and the EDF/EDIP: same fight? Or rather, the same fight but against each other? In any case, two mirror-image instruments. Or pitted against one another.

At first glance, the dividing line is clear: capacity-building via general regulations and the EU budget; operations and assistance via Council decisions and a fund financed by national contributions. In other words, the EPF belongs to the Member States, the EDF (and the EDIP) to the Union. Two different instruments serving different objectives but, above all, falling under different spheres of competence – and power.

Can the EPF become a Community fund? It is worth noting that the former European Development Fund (EDF), financed by extra-budgetary national contributions, was absorbed into the Union budget. The battle lasted 20 years. It ended in victory for the Commission, which, it is true, already managed the EDF, whereas this is not the case with the EPF.

The budgetary implications are minor. The difference between funding *via* the EPF based on national contributions proportional to GNI and budgetary funding *via* the budget amounts to a minor discrepancy of less than 0.5% (for France, 16.20% versus 16.55%).

On the other hand, the political stakes are significant. The decision-making procedures reflect the respective powers of each body (the Council and the Commission). Military operations and assistance missions (EPF) fall solely within the remit of the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the High Representative and '*with the support of the Commission*'. Whereas capability-building instruments (EDF and EDIP) fall under the Union's ordinary law, with the Commission taking the initiative and adoption by the legislator (European Parliament and Council). Thus, the power of initiative lies with the Commission and, once the regulatory framework has been adopted, decisions on the implementation of the EDF and the EDIP are taken by the Commission, following a procedure specific to each instrument.

Two paths are open: the path of integration, placing the Commission at the centre of the process. Despite the Council's activity via the EPF (60 decisions on assistance in three years), the momentum lies with the Commission. But if the decision had depended on a Commission initiative, would the military operations have taken place? Or the path of intergovernmental cooperation centred on small-scale national coalitions, modelled on the structured cooperation arrangements envisaged for capabilities. This possibility is provided for in Articles 43 and 44 TEU. '*The Council may entrust the implementation of a mission to a group of Member States which wish to do so and possess the necessary capabilities for such a mission*'. A dilemma between integration and national cooperation that is the hallmark of European history.

An analysis by the EPF reveals an (unhealthy?) competition between the two institutions. This tension cannot be sustained indefinitely. Any change will have major consequences. Initiative, funding, decision-making processes and unanimity are all at stake.

Nicolas-Jean Brehon

Honorary Advisor to the Senate

ANNEX 1
Ongoing European military operations and missions

Executive Missions

EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Launch: Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP of 12 July 2004. Stabilisation force with a UN mandate (Security Council Resolution 1575, 2004). The mandate has been renewed for twenty-two years (Security Council Resolution 2795 (2025) of 31 October 2025). These mandates give EUFOR an international executive mandate under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, authorising the use of force. EU military operation to support the country's efforts to maintain a climate of safety and security. EUFOR Althea had up to 7,000 soldiers from 26 countries, including several non-EU countries (Switzerland, Turkey, Albania). The number of troops has varied, falling to 600 before rising to 1,100 after the start of the war in Ukraine. The number of troops in 2025 is expected to be around 1,500 after the withdrawal of large contingents from the Czech Republic and Romania. France is sending only a modest contingent of around 30 soldiers. Cost: €71.9 million (2004 figure, not updated).

EUNAVFOR Atalanta

Launch: Council Joint Action 2008/851 of 10 November 2008. Operation in support of UN Security Council Resolutions 1814, 1816 and 1838 (2008). European Union military operation to contribute to maritime security (combating piracy) in the western Indian Ocean off the coast of Somalia. Atalanta was responsible for escorting ships from the World Food Programme and the African Union mission in Somalia. The number of attacks fell from 168 in 2008 to 1 in 2016. The military mission has been regularly reinforced. These comprise executive missions such as enforcing the arms embargo on Al-Shabaab, Somalia's parallel state, and non-executive missions to combat trafficking in drugs and charcoal (CFSP Decision 2020/2188). National contributions take the form of combat ships (between 4 and 13 vessels), ship-based helicopters, reconnaissance aircraft and marines. Atalanta had 19 participating States, including New Zealand and South Korea. In 2020, the extension of the missions led to the end of Germany's participation. Cost: €132.7 million.

EUNAVFOR Med Irini

Launch: with the Council Decision 2020/472 of 31 March 2020. Backed by UN Security Council Resolutions 1970 (2011), 2292 (2016) and 2473 (2019) of the UN Security Council, it aims to enforce the arms embargo imposed on Libya and, incidentally, to participate in the fight against human trafficking in the Mediterranean Sea and to train the Libyan coastguard. Ships from 24 participating countries tracked several hundred vessels, inspected 33 ships and seized three cargoes. Cost: €60 million.

EUNAVFOR Aspides

Launch: with the Council Decision 2024/583. Operation based on UN Security Council Resolutions 2624 (2022) and 2722 (2024). Military maritime security operation aimed at protecting maritime traffic in the Red Sea. Twenty-one participating countries. A French frigate participating in EUNAVFOR Aspides was attacked by several drones. On 23 February, the Council extended the mandate of Operation ASPIDES to preserve freedom of navigation until 28 February 2027. Cost: €25.4 million.

Non-executive Missions

EUTM RCA: European training mission in the Central African Republic. It follows on from the EUMAM CAR military advisory mission (Council Decision 215/78 of 19 January 2015), which itself followed on from the EUFOR CAR military operation. Participation of 248 soldiers from eight Member States and four third countries (including Brazil and Serbia). Cost: €82 million.

EUTM Somalia: European training mission in Somalia launched in 2010 (Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP). Participation of twelve Member States and one third country (Serbia). 187 soldiers (in 2017). Cost: €155 million.

EUMAM Mozambique: Military assistance mission in Mozambique. Launched on 1 September 2024. Twelve contributing states. Cost: €14.1 million.

EUMAM Ukraine: Military assistance mission in Ukraine. Launched on 15 November 2022 for two years and renewed in 2024 until 15 November 2026. Twenty-four contributing countries. Cost: €610 million (€435 million for training and €175 million for equipment).

ANNEX 2
The procedure for external military operations[19]

The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is an integral part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (Art. 42.1 TEU). The CSDP provides the European Union with an operational capacity based on civilian and military resources. The Union may use this capacity for missions outside the Union. These mandates include crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation operations (Articles 42.1 and 43 TEU). These interventions, involving combat forces, are commonly referred to as external military operations.

The decision to launch an external operation is taken unanimously by the Council (Art. 43.2), except in the case of constructive abstention (Art. 31). Abstention does not prevent the other Member States from adopting the decision. The State concerned may accompany its abstention with a formal declaration excluding it from any technical or financial participation. This was the case for Denmark until 2022. The decision is adopted on the initiative of a Member State or the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Before the Treaty of Lisbon, operations were decided in the form of "joint actions". Since 2007, they have been decided by the Council (CFSP). The Commission and the European Parliament are only marginally involved and only within the framework of the general provisions of the CFSP[20]. For the Commission, the contrast with ordinary EU law is clear. It does not have the power of initiative but can support the High Representative's initiatives (Article 30). However, it does have a role in the administration of operations. The European Parliament is consulted by the High Representative on the main aspects of the CSDP[21].

In practice, the Council's decision follows a request from a State or a United Nations resolution. The Council decides on a case-by-case basis whether an operation has military or defence implications within the meaning of Article 41.2 TEU. The decision sets out the mandate and duration – from a few months[22] to several years[23] – and a budget.

Several administrative structures prepare the Council's decision. The European External Action Service (EEAS), under the authority of the High Representative, is responsible for analysis and political contacts (consistency with Union policy, contacts with the UN). There are also two military structures set up around the Council: the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) and the Political and Security Committee (PSC). The latter, established by the Treaty (Art. 38 TEU), is the central institution in the Union's decision-making chain for CSDP matters. Member States are represented there by an ambassador. It provides political control and strategic direction for the crisis management operations referred to in Art. 43. It is assisted by a Political-Military Group (PMG), which deals with the political aspects of military issues upstream, and by the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), a military body attached to the Council. It provides the PSC with advice and recommendations in the military

[19] *Op cit*

[20] *The Commission and the Council ensure that the CFSP is coherent with other Union policies (art. 21.3)*

[21] *Art. 36 TUE.*

[22] *EUFOR Artemis in 2003, lasting three months joint Council action (CFSP) 2003/423*

[23] *EUFOR Althéa*

field and assumes the leadership of the Union's military activities. The EUMS is a political-military headquarters. An operational structure is attached to it: the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC). The command structure varies depending on whether the operations are "executive", i.e. involving combat forces, or "non-executive" (training, advice, assistance). The EUMS is responsible for planning and commanding non-executive missions. Executive operations are conducted by ad hoc headquarters set up in the framework nation[24] with a force planning and deployment headquarters and a field force headquarters, which itself appoints a force commander who is present in the field. Command rotates every six months.

As the European Union does not have its own armed forces, it calls on those of its Member States. Participation is voluntary. The decision to open up to third countries is taken on a case-by-case basis. The number of participating countries and the scale of deployments on the ground vary (from a few hundred men and women to several thousand). In the case of executive operations, the Council decision designates a framework nation that is most involved and whose personnel on the ground will be the most significant. In general, the armed forces participating in EU operations are drawn from "*EU battlegroups*" (EUBG), which are supposed to contribute to a rapid reaction force ready to be deployed on operations. The Helsinki European Council (12 December 1999) set a target of deploying 60,000 troops within 60 days to carry out Petersberg tasks. The battle group comprises 1,500 troops who can be deployed within 10 days for operations lasting less than three months.

In administrative and budgetary terms, operations fall under the European Peace Facility (EPF) created by a Council decision in 2004. The CFSP decision on the operation sets a "reference amount" representing the common costs of the operation shared between Member States, whether or not they participate in the operation. The common costs are listed and defined by the EPF decision. The EPF has a legal capacity separate from that of the Union, which enables it to enter into contracts, acquire equipment and ensure the implementation of the budget. These functions are carried out by an administrator and a secretariat, which are responsible for implementing assistance measures under the supervision of the PSC. The administrator appoints implementing partners, which may be States (Portuguese Ministry of Defence, Mozambique mission), international organisations (African Union) or private bodies entrusted with a public service mission (Expertise France in Mali). "In 2021, the High Representative appointed the European Commission as administrator of the assistance measures. This choice is somewhat surprising because it allows the EU executive – which is excluded from CFSP decision-making – to return to the game and be involved in the day-to-day management of the EPF"[25].

[24] *The EFFOR Althea stabilisation operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is an exception. The operation is being conducted under the Berlin Plus Agreement, and the operational command is based at NATO headquarters in Mons.*

[25] *op cit*

ANNEX 3
List of Military Operations

Year	Usual Name	Joint Council Action/ Décision (CFSP)	Aim	Duration	UN Mandate	Reference Cost M€
2003	**Concordia**	AC 2003/92	NATO relief in Macedonia	May-Sept 2003	Berlin +	4.7
2003	**Artémis**	AC 2003/423	Peace process in Congo			7
2004	**EUFOR Althéa**	AC 2004/570	Compliance with the Dayton Accords in Bosnia and Herzegovina	Duration undefined Ongoing	Berlin + and UN mandate Res. 1551 and seq.	71.7
2006	**EUFOR Congo**	AC 2003/423	Securing elections in Congo	June- Nov 2006	Support for MONUC (UN)	16.7
2007	**EUFOR Tchad**	AC 2007/677		2007-2008	Res. 1778 (2007)	99.2
2008	**EUNAVFOR Atalanta**	AC 2008/851	Humanitarian aid	2008-2009		8.9
2012	*(Atalanta)*	2012/174	Combating piracy off the coast of Somalia	2013-2014	Res. 1816, 1838 and seq.	14,9
2014	*(Atalanta)*	2014/827	Extension	2015-2016		14.77
2016	*(Atalanta)*	2016/2082	Extension	2017-2018		11.06
2018	*(Atalanta)*	2018/1083	Extension	2019-2020		11.78
2020	*(Atalanta)*	2020/2188	Extension	Ongoing		44.53
2021	*(Atalanta)*	2021/2188	Addition of non-executive missions	2021-2022		9.93
2022	*(Atalanta)*	2022/2441	Extension	2023-2024		10.4
2024	*(Atalanta)*	2024/3186	Extension	2025-2027		13.8
Ss tot			Extension			*132.71*
2011	**EUFOR Libya**	2011/210		2015-2020		7.9
2015	**EUNAVFOR MED Sophia**	2015/778	Support for humanitarian aid	2015-2016		11.82
2016		2016/993	Combating migrant smuggling	2016-2017		6.7
2017		2017/1385		2016-2017		6

2018		2018/2055		2019		1.1
2019		2019/535		2019		2.76
2019		2019/1595		2020		3.06
2020	**EUNAVFOR Med Irini**	2020/472	Arms embargo in Libya	2020-2021		9.94
2021	*(Med Irini)*	2021/542	Extension	2021-2023	Res. arms embargo 2292, 2247 and seq.	16.9
2023	*(Med Irini)*	2023/653	Extension	2023-2025		16.92
2025	*(Med Irini)*	2025/488	Extension	2025-2027		16.35
2024	**EUNAVFOR Aspides**	2024/583	Freedom of navigation in the Red Sea	2024-2025		8
2025	Aspides	2025/334	Extension	2025-2026	Res. 2722	17.4
2026	Aspides		Extension	2026/2027		
Total					**Berlin +**	**456.83**

Source: Compilation by the author, Council decisions (CFSP)

ANNEX 4

List of military missions (non executive mandate) - training

Year	Normal Name	CFSP decision	Subject	Duration	Cost/reference amount (Millions/€)
2010	EUTM Somalia (1)	2010/96	Army training	2010-2015	4.8
2015	EUTM Somalia (2)	2015/441		2015-2016	17.51
2016	EUTM Somalia (3)	2016/2239		2016-2018	22.95
2018	EUTM Somalia (4)	2018/1787		2018-2020	22.98
2020	EUTM Somalia (5)	2020/2032		2020-2022	25.23
2022	EUTM Somalia (6)	2022/2445		2022-2024	29.8
2024	EUTM Somalia (7)	2024/3184		2024-2026	31.81
Ss total					***155.08***
2013	EUTM Mali	2013/34	Army training		267.34
2016	EUTM RCA	2016/610	Advisory role to the Central African Armed Forces	2016-2018	18.18
2018	EUTM RCA (2)	2018/1941		2018-2020	26.13
2020	EUTM RCA (3)	2020/1133		2020-2022	36.96
2022	EUTM RCA (4)	2022/1034		2022-2023	7.81
2023	EUTM RCA (5)	2023/1600		2023-2024	5.21
2024	EUTM RCA (6)	2024/2396		2024-2025	5.84
Ss total					***81.95***
2021	EUTM Mozambique	2021/1143	Strengthening of the security forces	2021-2024	15.16
2024	EUTM Mozambique	2024/1354	Transition from EUTM to EUMAM	2024-2026	14.1
2023	EUPM Niger	2023/509	Strengthening the armed forces in the fight against terrorism		40
Total					***573.63***

Source: Author's compilation of CFSP decisions

ANNEX 5

EPF funding for military assistance

	Year	Beneficiary country or entity	Subject	Council Decision (CFSP)	Amount (millions of euros)
1	2021	African Union	Support to the African Union	2021/1210	130
2	2021	Bosnia	Demining	2021/1923	10
3	2021	Mozambique	Additional support to EUTM Mozambique (Decision 2021/1143)	2021/2032	85
4	2021	Georgia		2021/2134	12.75
5	2021	Ukraine	support for the armed forces: non-lethal equipment	2021/2135	31
6	2021	Moldova		2021/2136	7
7	2021	Mali	Additional equipment for EUTM Mali	2021/2137	24
	Total 2021				***300***
8	21/04/2022	African Unity	Support to the African Union	2022/667	600
9	21/04/2022	Mozambique	Additional equipment for the EUTM	2022/668	45
10	10/06/2022	Balkans	Strengthening military medical capabilities		6
11	30/06/2022	Moldova	Soutien forces armées	2022/1093	40
12	28/02/2022	Ukraine	Lethal force equipment for defensive purposes	2022/338	450
13	23/03/2022	Ukraine	idem	2022/471 (modif 338)	+ 450
14	13/04/2022		idem	2022/636 (modif 338)	+ 450
15	23/05/2022		idem	2022/809 (modif 338)	+ 490
16	21/07/2022			2022/1285 (modif 338)	+ 490
17	17/10/2022			2022/1971 (modif 338)	+ 490
18	28/02/2022	Ukraine	non-lethal equipment	2022/339	(50)
19	23/03/2022		idem	2022/472 (modif 339)	(100)
20	13/04/2022		idem	2022/639 (modif 339)	(150)
21	23/05/2022		idem	2022/810 (modif 339)	(160)
22	22/07/2022		idem	2022/1284 (modif 339)	(170)

23	17/10/2022		idem	2022/1972 (modif 339)	180
24	9/06/2022	Balkans	Medical Task Force	2022/906	6
25	2022	Somalia	Training for security forces	2022/2443	29,8
26	17/10/2022	Ukraine	EUMAM Ukraine	2022/1968	106.7
27	1/12/2022	Georgia	Support for the armed forces: non-lethal equipment	2022/2352	20
28	1/12/2022	Bosnia	Capacity building	2022/2353	10
29	1/12/2022	Rwanda	Deployment of forces to Mozambique	2022/2354	20
30	1/12/2022	Mauritania	Capacity building for the armed forces	2022/2355	12
31	1/12/2022	Lebanon	Support for the armed forces	2022/2356	6
	Total 2022				***3881.5***
32	2/02/2023	Ukraine	Non-lethal equipment	2023/229 (modif 339)	+ 200
33	2/02/2023		Lethal equipment	2023/230 (modif 338)	+ 300
34	2023	Ukraine	Military assistance	2023/231	45
35	13/04/2023		Lethal equipment	2023/810 (modif 338)	+ 1000
36	2023	Ukraine	Ammunition	2023/927	1000
37	2023	Ukraine	Military assistance	2023/2677 (modif 231)	+10
38	2023	Niger	Lethal force equipment	2023/1136	4.7
39	16/03/2023	North Macedonia	Military capabilities	2023/599	9
40	03/08/2023	Gulf of Guinea	Security and Defence Initiative in the Gulf of Guinea (military component)	2023/1599	0.18
	Total 2023				***2614***
41	29/04/2024	Cote d'Ivoire	Support for the armed forces	2024/1248	15
42	14/05/2024	Mozambique	Transformation of the EUTM into the EUMAM	2024/1354	14.1
43	2024	Moldova	Military equipment aid	2024/1713	9
44	2024	Lebanon	Support for the armed forces	2024/2496	15
45	15/07/2024	Albania	Support for the armed forces		13
46	22/07/2024	Armenia	Support for the armed forces		10
47	2024	Rwanda	Deployment of forces in Mozambique	2024/2880	20
48	2024	Benin	Assistance maritime	2024/1715	5
49	2024	Albania	Support for the armed forces	2024/1979	13

50	2024	Niger	Support for the armed forces	2024/2840	5
51	22/07/2024	Mauritania	Support for the armed forces	2024/2015	15
52	25/09/2024	North Macedonia	Military support	2024/	13
53	23/09/2024	Lebanon	Support for the armed forces	2024/2496	15
54	2024	Congo	Marine reinforcement	2024/2840	5
55	2024	Egypt	Support for the armed forces	2024/2843	20
56	8/11/2024	Ukraine	Modif EUMAM Ukraine	2024/2876	408.8
57	18/11/2024	Rwanda	Support for the deployment of forces in Mozambique	2024/2880	20
58	25/11/2024	Jordan	Support for the armed forces	2024/2935	13.25
	Total 2024				***614***
59	21/01/2025	Lebanon	Support for the armed forces	2025/129	60
60	28/02/2025	Montenegro	Support for the armed forces	2025/435	6
61	24/03/2025	Mauritania	Support for the armed forces	2025/609	20
62	2025	Moldova	Support for the armed forces	2025/697	40
63	24/04/2025	Moldova	Support for the armed forces	2025/809	20
64	25/04/2025	North Macedonia	Military Support	2025/823	15
65	8/07/2025	Senegal	Support for the armed forces	2025/1333	10
66	8/07/2025	Cabo Verde	Support for the armed forces	2025/1340	12
67	2025	Togo	Support for the armed forces	2025/1499	10
68	25/07/2025	Djibouti	Support for the armed forces	2025/1554	10
69	15/07/2025	Albania	Support for the armed forces	2025/1562	15
70	24/11/2025	Congo	Support for the armed forces	2025/2377	10
71	24/11/2025	Chad	Support for the armed forces	2025/2379	14.5
72	24/11/2025	Jordan	Support for the armed forces	2025/2387	35
73	4/12/2025	Gulf of Guinea	Security and Defence Initiative in the Gulf of Guinea (military component)	2025/2472	10.59
74	2025	Cote d'Ivoire	Support for the armed forces	2025/2506	20
	Total 2025				***288***
75	2026	Armenia	Support for the armed forces	2026/232	20

Military aid to Ukraine through funding from the European Peace Facility (EPF)

- **Supply of equipment capable of inflicting lethal force.**
  Council CFSP Decision 2022/338 of 23 March 2022. Amended by CFSP Decisions 2022/471, 636, 809, 1285, 1971 and CFSP Decisions 2023/230, 810

Total: 4,120 million €

- **Funding for equipment not intended for lethal force (fuel, protective equipment).**
  Council CFSP Decision 2022/339 of 23 March 2022, as amended by CFSP Decisions 2022/472, 637, 810, 1284, 1972, and CFSP Decision 2023/229

Total: 380 million €

- **Ammunition.**
  CFSP Decision 2023/927

Total: 1000 million €

- **EUMAM military assistance mission (military training).**
  CFSP decision 2022/1986 modified by CFSP decision 2024/2876

Total: 515.5 million €

- **Additional military assistance.**
  CFSP decision 2023/231 modified by CFSP decision 2023/2677

Total: 50 million €

Making a total of €6.07 billion.

On 18 March 2024, the Council decided to increase the EPF ceiling by a further €5 billion, a sum earmarked for Ukraine.

These amounts are to be supplemented by funding from the implementation of the ASAP (support for ammunition production) and EDIRPA (support for joint equipment procurement) regulations, which may also involve Ukraine.

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